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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Appellee, ] 
v. ] 
ERIC LEON BUTT, JR., ; 
Appellant. ] 
) Appeal No. 20090655 
JURISDICTION 
UT. CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(3) and UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) provide this Court with 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the Minutes Jury Trial Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment entered on July 20, 2009 (the "Judgment") by the Seventh Judicial District 
Court, San Juan County, State of Utah. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1: Was the evidence presented sufficient to establish the element of 
dealing harmful material to a minor beyond a reasonable doubt? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We review the legal sufficiency of factual findings, . . . 
and 'examine the conclusions of law arising from those findings under a correction-of-
error standard, according no particular deference to the trial court." Kimball v. Kimball 
2009 UT App 233, TJ14, 217 P.3d 733 (citations omitted). "The beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard is a requirement of due process..." Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 
S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). "Constitutional issues, including that of due 
process, are questions of law reviewed for correctness." Vigil v. Division of Child and 
Family Services, 2005 UT App 43, 107 P.3d 716, citing U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND 14. 
ISSUE #2: Was the evidence presented sufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the "material" would be harmful to a minor? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We review the legal sufficiency of factual findings, . . . 
and 'examine the conclusions of law arising from those findings under a correction-of-
error standard, according no particular deference to the trial court." Kimball v. Kimball 
2009 UT App 233, [^14, 217 P.3d 733 (citations omitted). "The beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard is a requirement of due process..." Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 
S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). "Constitutional issues, including that of due 
process, are questions of law reviewed for correctness." Vigil v. Division of Child and 
Family Services. 2005 UT App 43, 107 P.3d 716, citing U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND 14. 
ISSUE #3: Was the evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the alleged "material" would be "patently offensive to 
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect 
to what is suitable material for minors" as required in UTAH CODE 
ANN §76-10-1201 (5)(a)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We review the legal sufficiency of factual findings, . . . 
and 'examine the conclusions of law arising from those findings under a correction-of-
error standard, according no particular deference to the trial court." Kimball v. Kimball, 
2 
2009 UT App 233, [^14, 217 P.3d 733 (citations omitted). "The beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard is a requirement of due process..." Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 
S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). "Constitutional issues, including that of due 
process, are questions of law reviewed for correctness." Vigil v. Division of Child and 
Family Services, 2005 UT App 43, 107 P.3d 716, citing U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND 14. 
ISSUE #4: Were Butt's 5th Amendment rights violated when he was subjected to 
custodial interrogation at the jail absent his Miranda rights? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The Utah Supreme Court has mandated that appellate 
courts review custodial interrogation determinations for correctness, giving no deference 
to the trial court's decision." See State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ffi[42-43, I 4 4 ?-3d 1096. 
State v. Doran, 2007 UT App 119, | 9 , 158 P.3d 1140. 
ISSUE #5: Did the prosecutor or the trial court fail to adequately instruct the 
jury on the elements of the crime when it failed to instruct the jury as 
to which community standard applied? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "This court reviews the trial court's jury instructions on 
elements of a crime under a correctness standard." State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 
1290 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). However, jury instructions 
to which a party failed to object at trial will not be reviewed absent a showing of manifest 
injustice. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 19(c); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991) 
affd, 900 P.2d 1093 (Utah 1995). Failure to give an elements instruction for a crime 
3 
satisfies the manifest injustice standard under Rule 19(c) and constitutes reversible error 
as a matter of law. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991). 
ISSUE #6: Did the trial court err by failing to determine the material at issue 
was not the kind anticipated by UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1206 and, 
by this failure, further err by failing to determine the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of 
law, which we review for correctness." State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App. 326, \5, 100 P.3d 
231 citing Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,^5, 86 P.3d 735. "Additionally, 
'legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional,' and 'those who challenge a 
statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality.'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 99 P.3d 820 citing Greenwood v. City 
ofN. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991); see also State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, 
f8, 84 P.3d 1171. "[V]agueness questions are essentially procedural due process 
issues..." Id. citing State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, f l3 , 31 P.3d 547 (citation and 
quotation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. UTAH CONST. ART. I §§7 and 12 
B. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV 
C. UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. V and VI 
D. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1206 
STATEMENT OF THE CASfi 
On November 26, 2008, Eric Leon Butt, Jr., ("Butt") was charged by Information 
with two (2) counts of Dealing in Harmful Material to a Minor, both third-degree 
felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1206(1). ROOOl-0002. On December 
15, 2008, Butt pled not guilty to the charges. ROOM. Also on this same date, the 
preliminary hearing was held, whereat the trial court inferred from the evidence that there 
was a sexual connotation in regards to the material that was inappropriate and harmful. 
R0015. The trial court ordered Butt to be bound over for trial. R0017. 
Trial was held on July 15, 2009. R0026. Butt submitted the statutory definition of 
"harmful to minors," the statute setting forth the elements of Dealing in Harmful Material 
to Minors, and the statutory definition of prurient interests using community standards as 
jury instructions. R0043-0045. Butt further submitted the following instructions: 
To find that the Defendant attempted to distribute material harmful to a 
minor you must find that he intentionally took a substantial step to 
distribute it. If you find that the Defendant's actions in addressing a letter to 
his wife, that he knew would be screened by correctional officers, were 
intended to create a filter that would screen materials that others might find 
inappropriate, then you must find him not guilty. 
As a juror in this case you are required to utilize the perspective of the 
average person and in the process put aside your own particular tolerance or 
lack thereof of the material in question. You must apply the community 
standard without you [sic] own sensitivities so coloring your perspective as 
to render the notion of a community standard meaningless. 
The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
material has violated the community standard. If any particular juror 
determines that he or she cannot arrive at a community standard, or 
determines that one does not exist, then that juror must acquit. 
R0046-0048. 
On July 15, 2009, the jury found Butt guilty on both counts of Dealing in Harmful 
Material to a Minor (the "Verdict"). R0050. Butt waived the time for sentencing and the 
trial court sentenced Butt to 0-5 years for each offense, to be served concurrently but 
consecutively to Butt's present sentence (the "Sentence"). R0070. On August 11, 2009, 
Butt timely filed his Notice of Appeal 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Testimony of Alan Freestone. 
Alan Freestone ("Freestone") has been a deputy sheriff for San Juan County for 
eighteen years. Tr. at p. 49. Freestone is the jail commander responsible for the 
operations of the jail and has held this position for eight to nine (8-9) years. Id. Freestone 
testified concerning a mailbox on the wall in the jail that the inmates have access to 
during the day in which they deposit their letters. Id. The inmates may also place letters 
in the window of the blocks they are in, which officers will pick up at night. Tr. at pp. 49-
50. The graveyard shift removes the mail from the box and processes the mail, whereby 
they log it into the computer under the inmate's name and indicate to whom the mail is 
addressed. Tr. at p. 50. Incoming mail is opened and logged the same way. Id. 
Butt was in San Juan County Jail on November 14, 2008, and November 17, 2008. 
Id. Freestone received a photocopy of a letter written by Butt from Corporal Black 
("Black"), who indicated in a note to Freestone his concern about the type of material 
being sent out in the mail by Butt. Tr. at p. 51. However, Black had only photocopied the 
letter and had let it proceed through the jail's mail process. Id. Freestone testified he was 
also concerned after looking at the letter so, "I went to the outgoing mail and retrieved 
that letter for investigation." Id. 
Freestone identified State's Exhibit 2, which had Butt's name and address in the 
San Juan County Jail in the upper left hand corner (the "First Letter"). See, State's 
Exhibit 2. This letter is addressed to Cammy Butt, Butt's wife. Freestone opened the 
letter, which had previously been inspected by the jail as evidenced by the taping on the 
right hand side. Tr. at p. 52. Freestone cut the tape to get the original letter and to review 
it. Id. Freestone filled out a confiscation slip on the letter, notified Butt it was being 
confiscated, and informed him that Freestone was contacting the county attorney. Tr. at p. 
55. Freestone testified he spoke with Butt concerning the letter on November 14, 2008, 
and advised him the letter was being confiscated. Tr. at p. 56. Freestone also advised Butt 
that the reason for confiscation was listed as "contained material to a minor child that is 
considered harmful." Id. Freestone testified Butt admitted the letter was his, thought 
Freestone was blowing things about out of proportion, and that this was the way he joked 
around with his kids. Id. Freestone testified Butt had said his daughter requested the 
picture of himself. Id. Freestone testified he asked Butt why he would send a hand-drawn 
naked picture of himself to his five (5) year old daughter, and Butt said because his 
daughter requested it. Tr. at p. 61. 
Freestone next spoke with Butt on November 17> 2008, in reference to another 
letter Butt had deposited in the mail box. Id. Freestone then identified State's Exhibit 1, 
which has Butt's name and address in San Juan County Jail and addressed to Cammy 
Butt (the "Second Letter" and collectively, the "Letters"). Tr. at p. 62. Freestone 
testified he became aware of the Second Letter in the same manner as the First Letter. Id. 
Freestone testified that jail policy provides that all outgoing mail has to indicate it is mail 
of the San Juan County Jail, a complete address and the name of the inmate, and the 
inmate's name/number on the envelope. Tr. at p. 63. 
Freestone testified he again met with Butt on November 17, 2008, and indicated to 
him the Second Letter had been confiscated. Tr. at p. 64. Freestone testified he again 
expressed his concern about Butt sending this type of picture to his five (5) year old 
daughter. Tr. at p. 65. Freestone testified the picture shows Butt naked holding a small 
child to his mouth, with balloons that read, "Oh, your butt tastes so good," and "Ouch 
daddy, don't bite so hard, giggle, giggle." Id. Freestone testified Butt told him it's a game 
him and his daughter play, that he bites her and tickles her. Id. 
Freestone testified the picture was addressed to Butt's daughter, Sage, and there 
was no indication Butt did not know who Sage was. Id. Freestone also testified there was 
no indication Butt did not know who Kade was. Id. Freestone testified Butt admitted the 
Letters were produced by him. Tr. at p. 66. Freestone testified that, when he spoke to Butt 
about the Letters, they spoke about Sage and Kade in terms of them being Butt's daughter 
and son. Id. 
Freestone testified that, once inmates drop off their mail, the inmates cannot 
retrieve it. Id. Freestone testified that, once the mail is in the jail's mail box, the mail is 
considered sent. Tr. at pp. 66-67. Freestone testified he reviews the record of the mail 
inmates send out. Tr. at p. 67. Freestone testified that, when he went to retrieve the First 
Letter, he retrieved it from the front office of the jail. Tr. at p. 68. Freestone testified the 
Letters were addressed to Cammy Butt. Id. 
B. Motion to Suppress. 
Outside the hearing of the jury, Corrections Officer Martha Johnson ("Johnson") 
was examined as a witness to ascertain whether a Miranda warning was necessary when 
Butt was interviewed in the San Juan County Jail. See, Tr. at pp. 70-85. Johnson had been 
a corrections officer for eighteen (18) years. Tr. at p. 85. Johnson testified she had a 
conversation with Butt about the ages of his children. Id. Johnson testified the 
conversation took place in November of 2008. Johnson testified she asked Butt about the 
ages of his children because Freestone had requested she do so. Johnson testified that, 
later on, she became aware of letters Butt had written. Tr. at p. 88. Johnson testified she 
did not read Butt his Miranda rights before questioning him. Tr. at p. 89. 
At this point, counsel for Butt requested Freestone and Johnson's testimony be 
suppressed based upon their failures to advise Butt of his Miranda rights. Tr. at p. 90. 
The trial court determined the following: 
So I think the standard has to be exactly the same standard as it is if 
someone is out on the street. Are they going to consider that they are under 
arrest for this thing you're asking about, and if they are, then you have to 
give them the warning. If they're actually under arrest, or if they - a 
reasonable person would think they're under arrest for this, you have to 
give them the warning. 
In this case, they are nowhere near that point. There was no 
accusatory questioning. It doesn't appear that he was brought in and put 
under the lights or brought into an office and forced to visit there. It appears 
that the officers went to where he was and just asked him a question 
without telling they thought he was lying. 
So I don't think a Miranda warning was required here. It wasn't a 
custodial interrogation. I'll note its interesting we're having all this 
discussion when we probably could find lots of witnesses who could testify 
as to the ages of his children. There may be someone in the courtroom right 
now. If that's the only reason for Martha Johnson to testify, I wonder why 
we have to have the issue arise at all. 
Tr. at p. 92. 
C. Testimony of Martha Johnson. 
Johnson testified she had occasion to speak with Butt concerning his children's 
ages. Tr. at pp. 93-94. Johnson testified Freestone asked her to ask Butt what the names 
and ages of his children were, which he indicated were Sage, his daughter, five (5) years 
old, and Kade, his son, eight (8) years old. Tr. at p. 94. Johnson testified she was asked to 
do this sometime in the winter months of November or December. Tr. at p. 95. Johnson 
testified she either placed her note indicating Butt's children's ages in Freestone's box or 
handed it directly to Freestone, and she did so on the same day she questioned Butt. Id. 
D. Motion for Directed Verdict. 
Counsel for Butt requested a directed verdict, arguing the State failed to make a 
prima facie case. Tr. at p. 97. Butt argued the State failed to establish the age of the 
minor. Id. Butt further argued the State failed to meet the criteria of showing "that the 
material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests of the minor, or is patently 
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community, what is not taken as a whole has 
serious value for minors." Id. Butt argued the material anticipated under the harmful 
material statute did not apply to the instant case and relied upon the United States 
Supreme Court Case Miller, which indicates the material has to be "hard core" types of 
conduct. Tr. at p. 98. Miller was adopted by State v. Taylor, 644 P.2d 439 (Utah, 1983). 
Id. Butt argued the statute anticipated hard core pornography and the State had an 
additional burden of establishing what the community standards were. Tr. at p. 99. Butt 
requested the trial court to find that the material in the instant case was not the kind 
anticipated by the harmful material statute or, alternatively, that it find the harmful 
material statute unconstitutionally vague. Tr. at pp. 99-100. 
The State argued the material, taken as a whole and whether it is patently offense 
to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole, was a question for the jury. Tr. 
at p. 100. The State argued it had made a prima facie case. Tr. at p. 101. Butt argued that, 
for the material to patently offensive, the State had to have hard core pornography. Tr. at 
p. 102. Butt relied on Taylor in arguing the material was not hard core pornography and 
could not fall under the prurient interest section. Id. 
In its denial of Butt's Motion for Directed Verdict, the trial court stated the 
following: 
[I]t's obvious to me that the standard for what you can legally show an 
adult is very different from what you can legally show a minor...So, to 
argue that Miller v. California defines what can be harmful to minors is a 
complete non-starter with me. I think I have to deny the motion for a 
directed verdict and allow the jury to decide - I think there's good law that 
you don't have to have an expert on community standards. The jurors 
themselves, when you have eight of them, are certainly capable of being 
aware of what community standards are and applying those standards. 
There's adequate instruction in the statute and which the Court will give 
as to the boundaries for determining what crosses the line. So I'm denying 
the motion for directed verdict. 
Tr. at pp. 103-104. 
E. Testimony of Eric Butt. 
Butt was arrested on September 20, 2008, and resided in the San Juan County Jail 
until January 30, 2009. Tr. at p. 105. Butt testified that his arrest leading up to jail was for 
two (2) theft by receiving stolen properties and two (2) theft of services, charges wholly 
unrelated to the instant case. Id. Butt testified that he did send the Letters, addressing 
them to his wife, Cami. Tr. at p. 106. Butt testified he tried to write his family every day 
because he missed them and it was the first time they had been apart for quite some time. 
Id. Butt testified he had frequent contact with his family, speaking with them on the 
phone a couple of times a week, and having visits. Id. Butt testified his family still visited 
him, which includes his wife and children. Id. 
Butt testified he drew the picture because his daughter asked for him to draw it. 
Tr. at p. 107. Butt testified they had watched a documentary on cave dwellings and his 
daughter asked him to draw a picture of himself "like on the cave walls." Id. Butt testified 
they had watched this documentary earlier in the Summer. Id. Butt testified his daughter 
had asked why the people in the documentary were naked, and he had responded that it 
was just how they did it back then. Tr. at p. 108. Butt testified the drawings in the 
documentary depicted the male penis. Id. Butt testified he did not have any sexual intent 
in drawing the picture; Butt testified he did not intend for it to arouse his daughter, 
himself, or anyone else. Id. 
Butt testified he knew his wife would see it and, since she reads everything to the 
kids, he figured she would get a laugh out of it and think "[i]t's a pretty pathetic 
drawing." Tr. at p. 109. Butt testified the way the letter comes out of the envelope is the 
way he placed it in originally. Id. 
Concerning the Second Letter, Butt testified the reason for the drawing in it 
involved a tickling game he played with his daughter. Tr. at p. 110. Butt testified he 
would tickle her stomach and, if she rolled over he would say, '[r]oll back over or I'm 
going to bite your butt cheek." Id. Butt testified that, once he said this, she would roll 
back over. Id. Butt testified it was just a game that his daughter laughs and giggles 
through it. Id. Butt testified the Second Letter was not intended to arouse his daughter, 
himself, or anyone else. Tr. at p. 111. 
Butt testified he would cover himself if his daughter came in while he was 
showering. Id. Butt testified he does not shower with his daughter. Tr. at pp. 111-112. 
Butt testified that, since his daughter and son used to take baths together, she probably 
saw her brother's penis, and nothing in the Letters would have caused her alarm. Tr. at p. 
112. 
Butt testified that, although the sections of the Letters are segregated for when his 
wife read the letter aloud to the children, it was his intention for the children to see the 
pictures. Tr. at p. 113. Butt testified he was not hiding anything from his children or else 
he would not have sent them. Id. Butt testified the picture would not be appropriate for a 
ten (10) or twelve (12) year old girl but, due to his daughter's innocence, it would have 
been nothing to her. Tr. at p. 114. Butt testified that, until an adult explains otherwise, 
children do not think that way. Id. Butt testified the Second Letter was meant as a joke 
and his daughter would understand it, especially since she would know that "butt" does 
not taste "good." Tr. at p. 115. 
F. The Jury Instructions. 
The trial court determined that the State was required to prove all three (3) of the 
subsections of the harmful material statute. Tr. at p. 120. Without objection by either 
counsel, the trial court stated the State would have to prove the following: 
For something to be harmful to minors, it has to, 'Taken as a whole, appeal 
to the prurient interest in sex of a minor, be patently offensive to prevailing 
standards in the adult community and as a whole with respect to what is 
suitable material for minors, and taken as a whole, not have any serious 
value for minors.' 
Tr. at p. 120. The trial court also allowed the definition of "prurient" to be included. Tr. at 
pp. 122-123. The Instructions defined "prurient" as "marked by or arousing an 
immoderate or unwholesome interest or desire." Tr. at p. 124. 
The trial court stated, "I'd like to give the instruction on utilizing the perspective 
of the average person, and the community standard. That's I think, what the law is." Tr. 
at p. 123. The trial court continued as follows: 
So I'm just going to add three instructions. The elements offense from the 
State, the defense's definition of harmful to minors, and then adding as 
another definition the definition of prurient from Merriam-Webster, and 
then an instruction that says, "As a juror in this case, you are required to 
utilize the perspective of the average person, and in the process put aside 
your own particular tolerance or lack thereof of the material in question. 
You must apply the community standard without your own sensitivities so 
coloring your perspective as to render the notion of a community standard 
meaningless." 
Tr. at p. 124. Counsel herein found the State's definitions of the statutory terms to be 
acceptable. Id. 
Counsel herein did not object to the community standard as defined by the trial 
court; however, counsel did object to the trial court refraining from instructing the jury 
that, if any particular jury determines that he or she cannot arrive at a community 
standard or determines that one does not exist, then that jury must acquit, as found in 
Taylor. Tr. at pp. 124-126. The trial court, in noting the objection, stated, "I don't think 
you have to keep repeating, Tf you don't find one of the elements you vote to acquit.' We 
say that one time. That's the truth, and you can mention as much as you want in your 
argument[.]" Tr. at p. 127. 
G. The Verdict and Sentence. 
The jury found Butt guilty on both counts of dealing in harmful material to a 
minor and a poll of the jurors determined their Verdict to be unanimous. The trial court 
pronounced sentence on the same date of the trial and Verdict, sentencing Butt to 0-5 
years for each offense, to be served concurrently but consecutive to his present sentence. 
Tr. at p. 158. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
"No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless each 
element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Reyes, 2005 
UT 33, ^jll, 116 P.3d 305. "A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors 
when, knowing ... a person is a minor, ... the person intentionally: (a) distributes...to a 
minor...any material harmful to minors[.]"UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1206(1). The State 
failed to produce sufficient evidence on the elements that Butt distributed harmful 
material to a minor beyond a reasonable doubt. Such failure contradicts Butt's conviction. 
See, Reyes at^fll. 
"Distribute" is defined by statute as, "to transfer possession of materials whether 
with or without consideration." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1206(3). To convict a 
defendant of attempted dealing in material harmful to a minor, the State has to prove that, 
knowing the person at issue is a minor, the defendant "intentionally took a substantial 
step to distribute to a minor any material harmful to minors. State v. Hopkins, 2009 UT 
App 165, Tf2,— P.3d—. 
In the instant case, Butt did not commit any substantial step to "distribute" the 
material to a minor, as that term's ordinary and accepted meaning implies. To convict 
him of distributing harmfiil material to a minor, the State must prove the Butt 
intentionally took a substantial step towards distributing the material to his daughter, 
which he did not do. UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1206(1). 
The State further failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the material at issue 
was "harmful." The Letters are not patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult 
community. Under Miller v. California, our U.S. Supreme Court describes patently 
offensive material as hard core sexual content as it applies to the test for obscenity for 
adults. Ibid., 413 U.S. 15, 27, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (U.S.Cal. 1973). The Letters do not depict 
hard core sexual conduct. As testified to at trial, the reason Butt drew the first picture was 
because of his daughters' request after watching a documentary on cave dwellers, and he 
drew the second picture because of the tickling game he plays with his daughter. Neither 
of these drawings were patently offensive or displayed any type of hard core sexual 
conduct. 
Additionally, the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
material was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole 
with respect to what is suitable for minors. No evidence at trial was introduced indicating 
the Letters were patently offensive, which is the State's prerogative; however, the jury 
should have relied upon the average person's view from their community for making this 
determination. Furthermore, as discussed herein, the Letters were not patently offensive; 
hence, the Letters could not have offended the prevailing standards in the adult 
community, as a whole, with respect to what is suitable for minors. Additionally, the 
Harmful Materials Statute is vague as it applies to this case. The material in this matter 
was not the kind anticipated by the statute at issue, as it forbids, as a whole, hard core 
sexual conduct that is patently offensive. 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. and UT. CONST. ART. 1, §12 indicates that a defendant 
shall not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This Court 
has held, "...the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant uriless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." State 
v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah App.,1993) citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). This Court has held the custody factors as 
found in Mirquet are inadequate to determine whether an incarcerated suspect is in 
custody for Miranda purposes. See, State v. Swink, 2000 UT App. 262, [^10, 11 P.3d 299. 
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Hence, Swink determined, "[f]or persons incarcerated at the time of interrogation, the 
custody question generally turns on the 'added imposition' analysis outlined in 
Cervantes." Id. citing Id. at 428 (further citations omitted.) 
In U.S. v. Cadmus it was determined as follows: 
Furthermore, the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation derives in 
large part from the knowledge of the accused that he cannot escape his 
interrogator, and that the questioning can continue until the desired answer 
is obtained. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468, 86 S.Ct. at 1624; see also 
Murphy, 104 S.Ct. at 1145-46. In Murphy, the Court discussed the situation 
where "a suspect ... is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a 
persistent custodial interrogator." 104 S.Ct. at 1146. It would be hard to 
conceive of a situation where the accused was less able to escape his 
interrogator than in a prison setting. Compare Berkemer, 104 S.Ct. at 3149-
50 (motorist stopped for traffic stop reasonably expects to be free to 
continue on his way in short order). Indeed, in this case, Cadmus had 
already spent seven days in detention. There was no way for him to know 
when he might at least be able to return to his home. 
Ibid, 614 F.Supp. 367, 372 (D.C.N.Y.,1985). 
As an inmate in the San Juan County Jail, Butt was clearly not free to leave. 
Swink at Tfll. However, Freestone and Johnson's investigation of Butt placed further 
limitations on him than normal. Id. Johnson was acting as Freestone's investigator to 
further determine Butt's alleged criminal conduct - conduct Freestone clearly found so 
concerning he tracked down the First Letter from further processing - and any 
questioning should have been prefaced with the Miranda warning. Cadmus at 371-372. 
Lastly, the incorrect community standard was relied upon in this matter. 
"Contemporary community standards" is defined as, "those current standards in the 
vicinage where an offense alleged under this part has occurred, is occurring, or will 
occur." UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(2). The Utah Supreme Court has determined: 
Miller and subsequent cases also make clear the manner in which the 
community standards test is to be applied. The jury is to judge the material 
as the ''average person" would judge the material. The primary concern 
with requiring a jury to apply the standard of "the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards" is to be certain that, insofar as 
material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on 
an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person-
or indeed a totally insensitive one. See Miller, supra', Mishkin v. New York, 
383 U.S. 502, 86 S.Ct. 958, 16 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966); Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 LJEd.2d 1498 (1957). The U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated: 
This court has emphasized on more than one occasion that a 
principal concern in requiring that a judgment be made on the basis 
of "contemporary community standards" is to assure that the 
material is judged neither on the basis of the juror's personal 
opinion, nor by its effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive 
person or group. 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2902, 41 
L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). The Utah Supreme Court has approved jury 
instructions in pornography cases which incorporate these requirements that 
the jury look beyond their personal perspective to the community as a 
whole. See, e.g., State v. Pierren, Utah, 583 P.2d 69 (1978); State v. 
International Amusements, Utah, 565 P.2d 1112 (1977). 
Contrary to the appellant's analysis, the "average person" need not 
necessarily share the community consensus on what is obscene, but rather 
must be able to apply that community standard without his or her own 
sensitivities so coloring his perspective as to render the notion of 
community standard apart from the person's own perspective meaningless. 
A juror must be able to utilize the perspective of the "average person," and 
in the process put aside his or her own particular tplerance or lack thereof 
of the material in question. 
State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 448-449 (Utah 1983). Accordingly, the jury in this matter 
was required to rely on the local current standards in the vicinage where Butt's crimes 
occurred. UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(2). The jurors were entitled to draw on their own 
knowledge of the views of the average person in their community to make the required 
determination of whether Butt distributed harmful material to a minor. Summarily the 
errors in this matter amount to reversal below and any further action this Court deems 
appropriate and necessary. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT BUTT 
COMMITTED THE CRIMES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1206 (1) states as follows: 
A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing 
or believing that a person is a minor, or having negligently failed to 
determine the proper age of a minor, the person intentionally: (a) distributes 
or offers to distribute, or exhibits or offers to exhibit, to a minor or a person 
the actor believes to be a minor, any material harmful to minors;...[.] 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[t]his Court has in numerous cases stated that in 
presenting defenses in criminal cases a defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion. 
It is sufficient for acquittal that the evidence or lack thereof creates a reasonable doubt as 
to any element of the crime;' State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah, 1980) citing State 
v. Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66 (1977) (further citations omitted). This Court has held, 
"[generally, the function of a reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is sufficient 
competent evidence as to each element of the charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Pearson, 1999 UT 
App. 220, 1[13, 985 P.2d 919 citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991) 
quoting State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991) (internal quotations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held the following concerning the elements of the 
offense and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard: 
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless 
each element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The 
Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, 
linking it to both the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); Winship, 397 U.S. at 362, 
364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. The degree of certainty of guilt that we insist be held by 
those entrusted with judging the fate of persons charged with crimes before 
we will permit the State to wield its power to punish is not only a measure 
of evidence, but also in a more fundamental sense a gauge of our nation's 
conscience. The measure of certainty the law demands before finding guilt 
reflects the balance we are willing to strike between ensuring that all of the 
guilty are brought to justice and preventing the conviction and punishment 
of the innocent. 
Stated. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, Ifll, 116 P.3d 305. Accordingly, this Court reviews "the 
legal sufficiency of factual findings, . . . and 'examine the conclusions of law arising 
from those findings under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular 
deference to the trial court." Kimball v. Kimball 2009 WL 2619225, citing Cummmgs 
vjCummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
In the instant case, Butt argues the evidence was insufficient on the elements of 
the Harmful Material Statute to convict him of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See, Torres at 695. As further detailed below, the State failed to produce sufficient 
evidence on the elements that Butt distributed harmful material to a minor beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Such failure supports overturn of Butt's conviction. See, Reyes at ^11. 
To allow the Verdict in this matter to stand allows for a lesser degree of certainty of guilt 
than the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt suggests, infringing upon Butt's Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights. Id. The State has inappropriately wielded its power in this 
matter. The measure of certainty in this case reflects an imbalance of the prevention of 
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conviction and punishment of the innocent. See, id. Accordingly, as the evidence was 
insufficient to support the Verdict on several elements beyond a reasonable doubt, this 
Court must vacate the Verdict. 
A. The evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
the elements of Dealing in Harmful Material to a Minor. 
"Distribute" is defined by UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(3) as, "to transfer 
possession of materials whether with or without consideration." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-4-
101 governs Attempting to Distribute Harmful Materials and states as follows: 
For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if he: (a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the crime; and (b) (i) intends to commit the crime; or (ii) 
when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an 
awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result. (2) For 
purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly 
corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
In State v. Hopkins, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed what must be proven to convict 
someone of attempting to deal harmful material to a minor and stated as follows: 
To convict Hopkins of attempted dealing in material harmful to a minor, 
the State had to prove that knowing the person was a minor or "having 
negligently failed to determine the proper age of a minor," he intentionally 
took a substantial step to "distribute[] ... to a minor any material harmful 
to minors:" Id." [UTAH CODE ANN. §] 76-10-1206(l)(a), [UTAH CODE ANN. 
§] 76-4-101. 
Ibid, 2009 UT App 165, ^ |2 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, Butt dropped the letters addressed to his wife in the mail box 
that is provided for inmates at the San Juan County Jail. When Butt's letters were 
discovered by jail officials, they were confiscated. Freestone told Butt he was concerned 
about the content of the letters, and that he believed such content would harm Butt's 
daughter. Butt testified he did send the Letters and addressed them to his wife. Butt 
testified he knew his wife would see the pictures and, since she reads everything to the 
kids, he figured she would get a laugh out of it, stating, "[i]t's a pretty pathetic drawing." 
Butt indicated he intended for his children to see the pictures. Tr. at p. 113. 
Butt did not commit any substantial step to "distribute" the material to a minor, as 
that term's ordinary and accepted meaning implies. He did not transfer the drawing 
directly to his daughter. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-10-1201. He transferred the letters to his 
wife. Butt addressed the Letters to his wife, knowing each Letter would be screened by 
both corrections officials and his wife before his daughter ever saw it. He specifically 
mentioned the drawing to his wife in the Letters asking her whether it was appropriate to 
provide it to the daughter. To convict him of distributing harmful material to a minor, the 
State must prove the he intentionally took a substantial step towards distributing the 
material to his daughter. UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1206(1). Butt did not complete any 
substantial step in distributing the Letters. Butt simply granted his daughter's request— 
although he indicated to the mother that he was unsure why she had requested such 
drawings—and left it up to the mother as to whether his daughter would even be allowed 
to see the drawings. See, State's Exhibit #2, the First Letter. He did nothing to 
intentionally transfer the Letters to his daughter. To intentionally transfer the letters to 
his daughter, Butt would have needed to address the letters directly to her thereby 
circumventing her mother's review of such letters. This did not occur. He sent the letters 
to his wife and allowed her to determine whether the children could see the drawings. 
Butt relinquished his possession of the Letters to another adult to whom the 
Letters were addressed. This is not a crime. He did not mail the Letters directly to his 
daughter, nor did he ensure she would have possession of the contents. Butt anticipated 
that his wife would preview the contents first and, if she did not feel the contents were 
appropriate, would not show the child the drawings. The Letters were directed and 
transferred to his adult wife. Accordingly, Butt's distribution of the material to another 
adult does not meet the elements for dealing harmful material to a minor as set forth in 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1206. The material was distributed to another adult, causing no 
violation of the law. The evidence was thus insufficient to establish Butt "distributed" 
harmful material to a minor beyond a reasonable doubt. See, Pearson at f^ 13. 
B. The evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the "material" was such that it would be either harmful to a minor 
or appeal to a minor's prurient interests in sex. 
UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(5) defines "Harmful to minors" as follows: 
(a) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or 
representation, in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual 
excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse when it: (i) taken as a whole, appeals 
to the prurient interest in sex of minors', (ii) is patently offensive to 
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what 
is suitable material for minors; and (iii) taken as a whole, does not have 
serious value for minors, (b) Serious value includes only serious literary, 
artistic, political or scientific value for minors. 
(Emphasis added). "Material" is defined as, "anything printed or written or any picture, 
drawing, photograph, motion picture, or pictorial representation, or any statue or other 
figure, or any recording or transcription, or any mechanical, chemical, or electrical 
reproduction, or anything which is or may be used as a means of communication." UTAH 
CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(7). Under subsection (10)(a) the term "Nudity" is defined as 
"the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less 
than an opaque covering[.]" 
In analyzing whether a work or expression may be subject to state regulation, our 
United States Supreme Court determined that the "[permissible scope of regulation of 
any form of expression is confined to works which depict or describe sexual conduct, and 
that conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law. as written or 
authoritatively construed." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24. 93 S.Ct. 2606-2607, 
2615. 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). "A state offense must also be limited to works which, 
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex. which portray sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a while, do not have serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value." Id The U.S. Supreme Court laid the following foundation 
in Miller for trial courts to determine whether an expression is subject to state 
regulations, which mimics the definition of "harmful materiaf* found within our code, 
supra, at issue herein: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether wthe average 
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, . . .(b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. 413 U.S. at 24-25, 93 S.Ct. at 2615 (citations omitted). In Miller, having recognized 
the difficulty in determining a constitutional provision distinguishing between a willing 
adult and a willing minor, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded as follows: 
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Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution 
for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict 
or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed. We are 
satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer 
in such materials that his public and commercial activities may bring 
prosecution. 
Id, 413 U.S. at 27, 93 S.Ct. at 2616-2617 (citations omitted). 
Our Utah Supreme Court has determined the following concerning "harmful 
material:" 
The authority that we considered dispositive here and that reflects a 
legislative purpose to keep harmful materials away from minors simply 
because they are minors and where adults may not be affected because of 
maturity is Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 
195 (1968). The Supreme Court in that case, quoting from another equally 
apposite case, Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 271 N.Y.S.2d 
947, 218 N.E.2d 668 (1966), said: 
[M]aterial which is protected for distribution to adults is not 
necessarily constitutionally protected from restriction upon its 
dissemination to children. In other words, the concept of obscenity 
or of unprotected matter may vary according to the group to whom 
the questionable material is directed or from whom it is quarantined. 
Because of the State's exigent interest in preventing distribution to 
children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to 
protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by 
barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be 
suitable for adults. 
"The statute before the Court in Broderick and extant at the time of Ginsberg is almost 
the same as that in our own state." State v. Burke, 675 P.2d 1198, 1199-1200 (Utah 
1984). 
In Jenkins v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court stated that, "[e]ven though 
questions of appeal to the 'prurient interest' or of patent offensiveness are 'essentially 
questions of fact, it would be a serious misreading of [Miller] to conclude that juries 
have unbridled discretion in determining what is 'patently offensive/" Ibid., 418 U.S. 
153. 94 S.Ct. 2750. 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (U.S.Ga. 1974). Jenkins involved a movie theater 
showing a film that was alleged to be obscene, and which the U.S. Supreme Court 
determined was not obscene under the Miller standard, supra. Jenkins undertook the 
following analysis of the definition of "obscene material," and also provided insight into 
the definition of ^prurient interest.'* which is not defined in the applicable Utah Code at 
issue herein: 
* Material is obscene if considered as a whole, applying community 
standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is. a shameful 
or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and utterly without 
redeeming social value and if. in addition, it goes substantially beyond 
customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters. 
Id, 418 U.S. at 154-155. 
Although our Utah Legislature opted not to define "prurient interests," our 
appellate courts have sought to do so. The Utah Suprenie Court indicated that uthe 
definition of'prurient interest* raises conceptual and definitional difficulties. . .[ajlthough 
contemporary community standards provide the legal point of reference for determining 
prurient interest, mere nudity or simple reference to or discussion of sex does not, as a 
matter of law. appeal to the prurient interest." City of St. George v. Turner. 860 P.2d 
929. 934 (Utah 1993). "A prurient interest in sex under the law is not the same as a 
candid, wholesome, or healthy interest in sex." Id., citing Brocket! v. Spokane Arcades, 
Inc.. 472 U.S. 491. 498. 105 S.Ct. 2794. 2798-99, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985); State v. 
Bartanen. 121 Ariz. 454, 591 P.2d 546 cert, denied. AAA U.S. 884. 100 S.Ct. 174, 62 
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L.Ed.2d 113 (1979). "[W]hen determining whether a work appeals to the prurient 
interest, it must be judged as a whole, and not on the basis of its isolated parts." Id., 
citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; Roth v. United States. 354 U.S. 476, 489, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 
L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). "The context in which the sexual material is presented must also 
be considered." Id; see, Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231, 92 S.Ct. 2245, 2245-46, 
33LJEd.2d312(1972). 
In the instant case, two drawings are at issue. The first depicted a crude drawing 
of Butt in the nude. See, State Exhibit #2. The Second picture shows Butt nude holding a 
small child to his mouth, with balloons that read, "Oh, your butt tastes so good," and 
"Ouch daddy, don't bite so hard, giggle, giggle." See State's Exhibit #1. Butt drew the 
picture in the First Letter because his daughter asked for it based upon a documentary on 
cave dwellings they had watched. Butt testified at trial he did not have any sexual intent 
in drawing the picture and he did not he intend for it to arouse his daughter, himself, or 
anyone else. The reason for drawing the second picture was because of a tickling game 
he played with his daughter. Butt testified he would tickle her stomach and if she rolled 
over he would say, '[r]oll back over or I'm going to bite your butt cheek." Butt testified 
at trial that the Second Letter was not intended to arouse his daughter, himself, or anyone 
else. The trial court allowed the definition of "prurient" to be included in the instructions 
to the jury. Tr. at pp. 122-123. The Instructions defined "prurient" as "marked by or 
arousing an immoderate or unwholesome interest or desire." Tr. at p. 124. 
While this Court will surely recognize the jury impliedly determined the Letters 
appeal to the prurient interest by its Verdict, the jury did not have unbridled discretion in 
determining what is patently offensive. Jenkins at 160. The Letters were not such that 
they depicted a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion/" or were "utterly 
without redeeming social value" or went "beyond customary limits of candor in 
describing or representing such matters." Jenkins, supra, 418 U.S. at 154-155. Thus, the 
Letters do not meet the United States Supreme Court's accepted definition of appealing 
to the "prurient interests.*' However. Miller requires us to look to state regulations to 
determine whether the actions undertaken by Butt were considered a violation of those 
regulations or, in this case, the elements contained under UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1206. 
However, the Letters at most are a crude depiction of nudity and, as a matter of Utah law, 
thus do not appeal to the prurient interest. Turner, supra. Additionally, the United States 
Supreme Court has all but guaranteed that no defendant will be subjected to prosecution 
for the exposure of obscene or harmful materials unless the> depict or describe patently 
offensive whard core* sexual conduct. Miller, supra. Clearly the Letters do not rise to 
such in that they do not even depict sexual conduct, as argued further below, let alone 
anything that which would be considered "hard core" under the Miller standards. 
In the instant case, no evidence was presented concerning the material's "harmfUr 
nature as implied b> statute. Although the drawings contained in the Letters were most 
definitel} material as defined under statute, the State has failed to show how such 
drawings appealed to the prurient interest in sex of minors, or how it is patently 
offensively to the standards of the community located in San Juan County, Utah, or in 
Salt Lake City. Utah, where the child resides. The State failed to show how such 
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drawings were harmful beyond a reasonable doubt to Butt's daughter. UT. CODE ANN. 
§76-10-1201(5). 
The State has presented no evidence that meet the elements set forth in UT. CODE 
ANN. §76-10-1201(5). While the Letters may be construed as inappropriate by some 
standards, there was no evidence that they met the definition of "harmful material," 
which language under the Utah Code stems from Miller's analysis of what is considered 
obscene materials. The Letters did not meet either the state or federal courts' definitions 
of "prurient interest" and could thus not be considered "harmful material" with respect to 
the crime charged herein. Thus, Butt was unlawfully convicted on a standard below that 
of "beyond a reasonable doubt" and his conviction should thus be overturned. 
C. The evidence was insufficient to meet the element beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the "material" would be "patently offensive to prevailing 
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is 
suitable for minors." 
Many states have statutes prohibiting the exhibition, distribution, or sale to minors 
of material that is either "harmful to minors" or "obscene as to minors." The test in most 
laws is parallel to the current obscenity test for adults. See, ALA.CODE 1975 §13A-12-
200.1; A.R.S. § 13-3501(1) (Arizona); 11 Del. C. § 1365; Florida Statutes § 847.001(3); 
Code, 16-12-102(1) (Georgia); Hawaii Revised Statutes § 712-1210(7); Idaho Code § 18-
1514(6) (Idaho); Indiana Code § 35-49-2-2 (Indiana); V.A.M.S. 573.010(10) (Missouri) 
("pornographic to minors"); Montana Code § 45-8-205(1) (Montana); NEB.REV.ST. § 28-
807(6); N.C.G.S.A. § 14-190.13(1); NDCC, 12.1-27.1-02; GEN.LAWS 1956, § 11-31-
10(b) (Rhode Island); SDCL § 22-24-27(4) (South Dakota); T.C.A. § 39-17-901(6) 
(Tennessee); UC A. 1953 § 76-10-1201(11) (Utah); 13 V.S.A. § 2801(6) (Vermont) 
(emphasis added). UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1203(1) states what material or performance is 
pornographic and what of such material constitutes material that is harmful to minors. It 
states as follows: 
(a) The average person, applying contemporary community standards, finds 
that, taken as a whole, it appeals to prurient interest in sex; (b) It is patently 
offensive in the description or depiction of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual 
excitement, sadomasochistic abuse, or excretion; and (c) Taken as a whole 
it does not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 
The United States Supreme Court has given two (2) examples of conduct that may 
constitute material that is patently offensive: "(a) Patently offensive representations or 
descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated: (b) Patently 
offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd 
exhibitions of the genitals." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15. 27, 93 S.Ct. 2607 
(U.S.Cal. 1973). Miller made plain that "no one will be subject to prosecution for the 
sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently 
offensive *hard core' sexual conduct." Jenkins, supra, at 160 citing Miller at 27. UT. 
CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(14) defines sexual conduct as: 
[Ajcts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touching of a person's 
clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks. Or, if the person is a 
female, breast, whether alone or between members of the same or opposite 
sex or between humans and animals in an act of apparent or actual sexual 
stimulation or gratification. 
In the case of State v. Taylor, a case further detailed post, Miller is relied upon in its 
determination that, in part (b) of the Miller test for obscenity, the material would have to 
be "hard core" to be patently offensive. See, State v. Taylor. 664 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 
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1983) citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 1763, 52 
L.Ed.2d 324 (1977). 
"Contemporary community standards" is defined as "those current standards in the 
vicinage where an offense alleged under this part has occurred, is occurring, or will 
occur." UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(2). The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[t]he 
wording the statute clearly establishes a local standard as opposed to a statewide 
standard" according the statute's plain language. State v. International Amusements, 565 
P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977). International Amusements continued as follows: 
A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the 
average person in the community or vicinage from which he comes for 
making the required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his 
knowledge of the propensities of a "reasonable" person in other areas of the 
law. 
Id. at 1114, quoting Hambling v. U. S„ 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 
(1974). 
The United States Supreme Court has determined the following concerning 
community standards: 
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations 
on the powers of the States do not vary from community to community, but 
this does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform 
national standards of precisely what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is 
'patently offensive.' These are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation 
is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that 
such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, 
even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists. When triers of fact are 
asked to decide whether 'the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards' would consider certain materials 'prurient,' it would 
be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some abstract 
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate 
factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers of fact 
to draw on the standards of their community, guided always by limiting 
instructions on the law. To require a State to structure obscenity 
proceedings around evidence of a national 'community standard' would be 
an exercise in futility. 
Miller at 30. 
In the instant case, the State failed to present any evidence to the prevailing 
standard in the adult community that would deem the Letters "patently offensive" except 
for Freestone's own personal concern about them. Freestone testified he was concerned 
after looking at the letter so "I went to the outgoing mail and retrieved that letter for 
investigation." Id. Freestone similarly testified concerning the Second Letter. 
The factors for determining whether material or performance is pornographic are 
identical to determining whether material is harmful to a minor. See, UT. CODE ANN. 
§76-10-1203(1) and UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(5). Obscenity will not be prosecuted 
unless it is patently offensive "hard core'* sexual conduct Jenkins at 160 citing Miller at 
27. The nature of the drawings in the Letters at issue herein would not be considered 
patently offensive to the adult community. The Letters do not depict hard core 
pornography, or even a sexual act. The drawings are merely crude stick figures 
attempting to depict nudity, but do not depict any sexual acts, masturbation, or lewdness. 
UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(14). 
The Letters depict simple stick figures that were drawn based upon a documentary 
watched by a father and daughter and based upon a game played by a father and 
daughter. Parents in Utah are allowed to accompany minors into R-rated movies 
depicting images of actual sex and nudity without fear of prosecution. It is axiomatic that 
the Letters are completely harmless in comparison and depict only those things a child 
would see in books about the human anatomy, but in a much more crude and less 
decipherable manner. 
The contemporary community standards to be applied in this matter was that of 
the vicinage wherein the offenses alleged occurred. UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(2). The 
jurors in this matter were entitled to draw on his or her own knowledge of the views of 
the average person in their community for making this determination, just as he or she 
would be entitled to draw on his or her knowledge of the propensities of a reasonable 
person in other areas of the law. International Amusements at 1114. Miller determined a 
jury should rely on local standards of what the community would consider obscene. Id. at 
26. The community standards throughout the State of Utah have been recognized by the 
Legislature to be diverse; hence, the triers of fact were asked to decide whether the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would consider the Letters 
patently offensive. See, Miller at 30. The average person would most likely not find the 
drawings patently offensive. Thus, the element respecting patent offense to the 
community standards could not be proven in this matter beyond a reasonable doubt and 
the conviction should thus be overturned. 
II. APPELLANT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED 
WHEN HE WAS SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION IN 
JAIL WITHOUT MIRANDA. 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. and UT. CONST. ART. 1, §12 indicate that a defendant 
shall not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This Court 
has held, "...the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." State 
v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968. 971 (Utah App.,1993) citing Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 
444. 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Such safeguards w\..come into play whenever 
a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 
equivalent." Id., citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300. 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 
L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); see also State v. Mirquet 844 P.2d 995, 997 (Utah App..l992) ("[a]s 
a matter of federal law. an individual's right to the protections afforded in Miranda are 
triggered the moment the individual is subject to custodial interrogation."). Mirquet 
further continues as follows: 
We concluded [in State v. Sampson. 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App.1990)] that 
Utah courts place "a great deal of emphasis on the form of the questioning'' 
in assessing whether the defendant is in custody. Id. If questioning is 
"merely investigatory, courts have not found custody." Id. {citing State v. 
Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah, 1986). However, the moment the questioning 
becomes accusatory "custody is likely and Miranda warnings become 
necessary." Id. (citing Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170; Kelly. 718 P.2d at 391). 
The court identified the change from investigatory to accusatory 
questioning as happening when the Cw'police have reasonable grounds to 
believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to 
believe that the defendant has committed i t /" Id. 808 P.2d at 1106 (quoting 
Carner. 664 P.2d at 1171). 
State v. Mirquet 844 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah App., 1992) (alteration to the original). 
This Court has held the custody factors as found in Mirquet are inadequate to 
determine whether an incarcerated suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes. See, State 
v. Swink. 2000 UT App. 262, <|10, 11 P.3d 299. Hence. Swink determined. ~[f]or persons 
incarcerated at the time of interrogation, the custody question generally turns on the 
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'added imposition' analysis outlined in Cervantes/'' Id. citing Id, at 428; (further citations 
omitted.) Swink held as follows: 
In any Miranda analysis, whether the encounter occurs on the street, or 
within the walls of a correctional facility, we must consider whether the 
individual was "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Since a prisoner in a 
correctional facility is obviously not free to leave the facility, we must look 
for "a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added 
imposition on his freedom of movement," or "some act which places 
further limitations on the prisoner." Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428. The 
Cervantes court offered the following four relevant considerations to be 
viewed from the perspective of a reasonable prisoner: (1) the language used 
to summon the inmate, (2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation, 
(3) the extent to which the inmate is confronted with evidence of his guilt, 
and (4) the additional pressure exerted to detain the inmate. See id. 
Id. at Tfll. Swink determined that, since the questioning at issue was not part of an 
"extraordinary event" but was "part of the administrative procedures used when any 
individual is brought to the facility," Swink was not deprived of his freedom of action in 
any significant way. Id. at [^12. This was supported by, "[t]he only evidence of Swink's 
guilt in committing the crime came from Swink himself. The purpose of the interview 
was to find out information that would assist the staff in housing Swink at the facility, not 
to present him with evidence of his culpability in the vehicle theft." Id. at ^|13. Hence, 
Swink determined he was not subjected to any additional restraint when he made the 
incriminating statements and, after considering the totality of the circumstances, 
concluded a reasonable prisoner in Swink's position would not feel that there were any 
additional impositions on his freedom relating the interview to a degree that would 
necessitate the interview be preceded by Miranda. Id. at Tfl5. 
The Fourth Circuit has stated the following: 
A different approach to the custody determination is warranted in the 
paradigmatic custodial prison setting where, by definition, the entire 
population is under restraint of free movement. The Ninth Circuit has taken 
the position that "restriction" is a relative concept ai}d that, in this context, 
it "necessarily implies a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which 
results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement." Cervantes, 
589 F.2d at 428. Thus, the court looked to the circumstances of the 
interrogation to determine whether the inmate was subjected to more than 
the usual restraint on a prisoner's liberty to depart. 
U.S. v. Conley. 779 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus, a reconciliation oi Miranda must be 
made in inmate cases. In U.S. v. Cadmus, it states as follows and sheds some further 
light on this issue: 
The court in Cervantes rejected a per se rule that any investigatory 
questioning inside a prison requires Miranda warnings. 589 F.2d at 427. In 
determining that the questioning involved had not occurred while the 
defendant was in custody, the court in Cervantes held that an "added 
imposition on [the inmate's] freedom of movement" is necessary to 
constitute "custody" within the principles of Miranda. Id. at 428. See also 
Scalf 725 F.2d 1272 (adopting reasoning of Cervantes ). Moreover, the 
courts analogized the interrogations involved to on-tne-scene questioning. 
Scalf 725 F.2d at 1276; Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 429. Recognizing that the 
Court in Miranda had explained that "[gjeneral on-thef scene questioning as 
to facts surrounding a crime ... is not affected by our holding.'" 384 U.S. at 
477, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, the courts in Cervantes and Scalf held that Miranda 
warnings were not required. This Court, however, does not find the 
reasoning of these cases persuasive. 
Ibid, 614 F.Supp. 367. 370 (D.C.N.Y.,1985). Cadmus found, "that prison interrogation, 
whether by an investigator concerning prior potentially criminal conduct, or by a prison 
guard regarding prison crime immediately after its discovery, is custodial within the 
meaning of Miranda" Id. at 371-372. In support of this determination, Cadmus 
continued: 
A rule that persons in prison are in custody and must be ad\ised of their 
rights prior to questioning is fully consistent with the logic underlying 
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Miranda and Mathis. Miranda established a prophylactic rule intended to 
ensure that suspects are not coerced into confessing. See Berkemer, 104 
S.Ct. at 3147; see also Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74, 100 S.Ct. at 2188. The 
rule was designed for situations believed to be intrinsically coercive and 
susceptible of abuse. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624 
("inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not 
otherwise do so freely"); see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 
S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). Prison is certainly a "police 
dominated" surrounding that is inherently coercive. See Berkemer, 104 
S.Ct. at 3150, 3150 n. 28. Miranda recognized the powerful psychological 
effect on a person confined, alone with his interrogator, which often 
induces the individual to reach for aid. 384 U.S. at 448-55, 86 S.Ct. at 
1614-17. This powerful influence is certainly present when the individual is 
confined in prison. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74, 100 S.Ct. at 2188. 
Furthermore, the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation derives in 
large part from the knowledge of the accused that he cannot escape his 
interrogator, and that the questioning can continue until the desired answer 
is obtained. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468, 86 S.Ct. at 1624; see also 
Murphy, 104 S.Ct. at 1145-46. In Murphy, the Court discussed the situation 
where "a suspect ... is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a 
persistent custodial interrogator." 104 S.Ct. at 1146. It would be hard to 
conceive of a situation where the accused was less able to escape his 
interrogator than in a prison setting. Compare Berkemer, 104 S.Ct. at 3149-
50 (motorist stopped for traffic stop reasonably expects to be free to 
continue on his way in short order). Indeed, in this case, Cadmus had 
already spent seven days in detention. There was no way for him to know 
when he might at least be able to return to his home. 
Id. at 372. 
In the instant case, Freestone received a photocopy of a letter written by Butt from 
Black. Tr. at p. 51. Freestone testified he was concerned after looking at the letter so "I 
went to the outgoing mail and retrieved that letter for investigation." Id. Freestone 
testified he spoke with Butt concerning the letter on November 14, 2008, and advised him 
the letter was being confiscated. Tr. at p. 56. Freestone next spoke with Butt on 
November 17, 2008, in reference to the Second Letter. Id. Freestone testified he became 
aware of the Second Letter in the same manner as the First Letter. Tr. at p. 62. Freestone 
testified he indicated to Butt the Second Letter had been confiscated. Tr. at p. 64. 
Johnson testified she had a conversation with Butt about the ages of his children. 
Tr. at p. 85. Johnson testified the conversation took place in November of 2008. Johnson 
testified she asked Butt about the ages of his children because Freestone had asked her to 
do so. Johnson testified Freestone did not tell her wiry to ask about Butt's children's ages 
until after she asked him. Tr. at p. 87. Johnson testified that later on. she became aware 
of letters Butt had written. Tr. at p. 88. Johnson testified she did not read Butt his 
Miranda rights before questioning him. Tr. at p. 89. Johnson testified she asked Butt what 
the names and ages of his children were, which he indicated )vere Sage, his daughter, five 
(5) \ears old. and Kade. his son. eight (8) years old. Id. Johnson testified she either 
placed her note indicating Butt's children's ages in Freestones box or handed it directly 
to Freestone and she did so on the same day she questioned Butt. Tr. at p. 95. 
In its denial of Butt's Motion to Suppress in regards to Miranda, the trial court 
determined the following: 
So I think the standard has to be exactly the same standard as it is if 
someone is out on the street. Are they going to consider that they are under 
arrest for this thing you're asking about, and if they are. then you have to 
give them the warning. If they're actually under aifrest. or if they - a 
reasonable person would think they're under arrest for this, you have to 
give them the warning. 
In this case, they are nowhere near that point. There was no 
accusatory questioning. It doesn't appear that he was brought in and put 
under the lights or brought into an office and forced to visit there. It appears 
that the officers went to where he was and just asked him a question 
without telling they thought he was lying. 
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So I don't think a Miranda warning was required here. It wasn't a 
custodial interrogation. I'll note its interesting we're having all this 
discussion when we probably could find lots of witnesses who could testify 
as to the ages of his children. There may be someone in the courtroom right 
now. If that's the only reason for Martha Johnson to testify, I wonder why 
we have to have the issue arise at all. 
Tr. at p. 92. 
As an inmate in the San Juan County Jail, Butt was clearly not free to leave. Swink 
at Tfl 1. However, Freestone and Johnson's investigation of Butt placed further limitations 
on him than normal. Id. Johnson was acting as Freestone's investigator to further 
determine Butt's criminal conduct - conduct Freestone clearly found so concerning he 
tracked down the First Letter from further processing - and because of this increased 
limitation, any questioning should have been prefaced with the Miranda warning. 
Cadmus at 371-372. 
Miranda was intended to ensure suspects are not coerced into confessing as it was 
designed for situations believed to be intrinsically coercive and susceptible to abuse. Id. 
at 372. Butt was faced with such a situation by simply being in jail when he was 
questioned by Johnson. See, id. By being in jail, Butt would not have been able to 
"escape" his interrogators and the questioning would have continued until Freestone 
obtained the desired answers. Id. Butt resided in the San Juan County Jail from 
September 20, 2008, until January 30, 2009. Tr. at p. 105. He was questioned by Johnson 
in November of 2008. Clearly he would have been unable to avoid Freestone or Johnson 
because he resided in the jail. See, Cadmus at 372. He was in a situation that could have 
caused abuse and been coercive simply because he was in jail and had no were else to go 
to avoid any questioning. Cadmus at 371-372. 
However, should this Court remain unpersuaded by Cadmus, a Miranda warning 
was still required. Freestone was clearly investigating Butt for criminal conduct, a fact 
the trial court acknowledged stating, 'w[t]hat seems absurd to me. Of course [the deputies] 
were wondering whether he committed a crime." Tr. at p. 78. The trial court continued, 
"They've looked at these drawings. They look offensive to them. They think a crime was 
committed. The> may have even consulted the code book...but clearly. Deputy Freestone 
had it in his mind. T think this ma> be a crime/...They were seriously thinking yes, there 
was a crime/' Tr. at pp. 78-79 
The record is silent as to precisely when Johnson questioned Butt in order to 
ascertain the ages of his children. However, the Letters were sent November 14 and 17, 
2008. respectively, and the Information was filed on November 26, 2008. Freestone 
spoke with Butt upon the Letters' discovery and sometime before the filing of 
Information. Johnson obtained the necessary statement in order for the State to file 
charges. Such conduct necessarily requires a Miranda warning as Butt was clearly 
subjected to custodial interrogation without the privilege of being warned against self-
incrimination. Hayes at 971. He was not informed that he did not have to answer 
Johnson's questions if such responses could be used against hlim. Id. 
Johnson subjected Butt to express questioning by asking him the ages of his 
children. This information was used to produce criminal charges. Furthermore. Freestone 
used Johnson to obtain the information he required for the State to file criminal charges 
against Butt. Johnson's questions were accusatory because Freestone had reasonable 
grounds to believe crimes had been committed and reasonable grounds to believe Butt 
had committed them. Mirquet at 998. Therefore, a Miranda warning was required and in 
its absence, Butt was compelled to be a witness against himself in violation of his federal 
and state constitutional rights. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. and UT. CONST. ART. 1, §12. 
III. THE JURY UTILIZED THE INCORRECT COMMUNITY STANDARD. 
"Contemporary community standards" is defined as "those current standards in the 
vicinage where an offense alleged under this part has occurred, is occurring, or will 
occur." UT. CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(2). The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[t]he 
wording the statute clearly establishes a local standard as opposed to a statewide 
standard" according to the statute's plain language. State v. International Amusements, 
565 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977). International Amusements continued: 
A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the 
average person in the community or vicinage from which he comes for 
making the required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his 
knowledge of the propensities of a "reasonable" person in other areas of the 
law. 
Id at 1114 quoting Hambling v. U. S„ 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 
(1974). 
In its determination of "obscene" material, the United States Supreme Court 
determined the following: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Kois v. Wisconsin, 
supra, 408 U.S., at 230, 92 S.Ct., at 2246, quoting Roth v. United States, 
supra, 354 U.S., at 489, 77 S.Ct., at 1311; (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (U.S.Cal. 1973). Miller further held: 
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution 
for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict 
or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed. We are satisfied 
that these specific prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer in such 
materials that his public and commercial activities may bring prosecution. 
See Roth v United States, supra, 354 U.S., at 491-492, 77 S.Ct., at 1312-
1313. Cf. Ginsberg v. New York 390 U.S., at 643, 88 S.Ct. at 1282. If the 
inability to define regulated materials with ultimate, god-like precision 
altogether removes the power of the States or the Congress to regulate, then 
'hard core" pornography may be exposed without lir^ iit to the juvenile, the 
passerby, and the consenting adult alike, as. indeed, Mr. Justice Douglas 
contends. 
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations 
on the powers of the States do not vary from community to community, but 
this does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform 
national standards of precisely what appeals to the wprurient interest' or is 
'patently offensive/ These are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation 
is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that 
such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, 
even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists. When triers of fact are 
asked to decide whether 'the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards' would consider certain materials 'prurient,* it would 
be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some abstract 
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors ^s the usual ultimate 
factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers of fact 
to draw on the standards of their community, guided always by limiting 
instructions on the law. To require a State to structure obscenity 
proceedings around evidence of a national 'community standard" would be 
an exercise in futility. 
Id. at pp. 27-28. 30. Miller summarily reaffirmed "that obscene material is not protected 
by the First Amendment;" held, "that such material can be regulated by the States, subject 
to the specific safeguards enunciated above, without a showing that the material is 
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'utterly without redeeming social value';" and held, "that obscenity is to be determined 
by applying 'contemporary community standards[.]'" Id. at pp. 36-37. 
The Utah Supreme Court analyzed the question of whether a trial court must 
instruct the jury in a pornography case that if they are unable to determine a community 
standard they must acquit the defendant. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983). 
Taylor argued such an instruction is necessary as it requires the State to meet its burden 
of proving the existence and content of a community standard and because it ensure that 
convictions will only result where there exists a community standard sufficiently 
"knowable" to give a defendant prior notice of what the law commands or forbids. Id. at 
448. Taylor cited to the Miller test of whether material may be prosecuted as obscene 
under the First Amendment. Id. Taylor continued as follows: 
The phrasing of the Miller test makes clear that contemporary community 
standards take on meaning only when they are considered with reference to 
the underlying questions of fact that must be resolved in an obscenity case. 
The test itself shows that appeal to the prurient interest is one such question 
of fact for the jury to resolve. The Miller opinion indicates that patent 
offensiveness is to be treated in the same way. The fact that the jury must 
measure patent offensiveness against contemporary community standards 
does not mean, however, that juror discretion in this area is to go 
unchecked. Both in Hamlin and in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 [94 
S.Ct. 2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642] (1974), the Court noted that part (b) of the 
Miller test contained a substantive component as well. The kinds of conduct 
that a jury would be permitted to label as "patently offensive" in a §1461 
prosecution are the "hard core" types of conduct suggested by the examples 
given in Miller. 
Id. citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 1763, 52 L.Ed.2d 
324 (1977). Taylor determined as follows: 
Miller and subsequent cases also make clear the manner in which the 
community standards test is to be applied. The jury is to judge the material 
as the "average person"' would judge the material. The primary concern 
with requiring a jury to apply the standard of Cwthe average person, applying 
contemporary community standards" is to be certain that, insofar as 
material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on 
an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person-
or indeed a totally insensitive one. See Miller, supra; Mishkin v. New York, 
383 U.S. 502, 86 S.Ct. 958, 16 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966); Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). The U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated: 
This court has emphasized on more than one occasion that a 
principal concern in requiring that a judgment be made on the basis 
of ^contemporary community standards" is to assure that the 
material is judged neither on the basis of the juror's personal opinion, 
nor by its effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person or 
group. 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87. 107, 94 S.Ct. 2887. 2902. 41 
L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). The Utah Supreme Court has approved jury 
instructions in pornography cases which incorporate these requirements that 
the jury look beyond their personal perspective to the community as a 
whole. See, e.g., State v. Pierren, Utah, 583 P.2d 69 (1978); State v. 
International Amusements, Utah, 565 P.2d 1112 (1977). 
Contrary to the appellant's analysis, the "average person" need not 
necessarily share the community consensus on what is obscene, but rather 
must be able to apply that community standard without his or her own 
sensitivities so coloring his perspective as to render the notion of 
community standard apart from the person's own perspective meaningless. 
A juror must be able to utilize the perspective of the "average person." and 
in the process put aside his or her own particular tolerance or lack thereof 
of the material in question. 
Id. at 448-449. Accordingly, Taylor held, "[t]he State does have the burden of showing 
that the material has violated the community standards Id. at 450. Tavlor states. "If the 
State chooses, as is its option under U.C.A., 1953, §76-10-1203(3), not to put on expert 
testimony, or any evidence, as to the community standard, it assumes the risk of a juror's 
not being able to arrive at such a community standard and voting to acquit a defendant." 
Id. at 449-450. The Utah Supreme Court has upheld, "[w]e have previously held that the 
jurors themselves are to determine the community standards." State v. Piepenburg, 602 
P.2d 702, 708 (Utah, 1979) citing State v. Pierren, Utah, 583 P.2d 69 (1978). 
In the instant case, the trial court stated, "I'd like to give the instruction on 
utilizing the perspective of the average person, and the community standard. That's I 
think, what the law is." Tr. at p. 123. The trial court continued: 
So I'm just going to add three instructions. The elements offense from the 
State, the defense's definition of harmful to minors, and then adding as 
another definition the definition of prurient from Merriam-Webster, and 
then an instruction that says, "As a juror in this case, you are required to 
utilize the perspective of the average person, and in the process put aside 
your own particular tolerance or lack thereof of the material in question. 
You must apply the community standard without your own sensitivities so 
coloring your perspective as to render the notion of a community standard 
meaningless." 
Tr. at p. 124. 
Counsel herein did not object to the community standard as defined by the trial 
court; however, counsel did object to the trial court refraining from instructing the jury 
that, if any particular juror determines that he or she cannot arrive at a community 
standard or determines that one does not exist, then that jury must acquit, as found in 
Taylor. Tr. at pp. 124-126. The trial court, in noting the objection, stated, "I don't think 
you have to keep repeating, Tf you don't find one of the elements you vote to acquit.' We 
say that one time. That's the truth, and you can mention as much as you want in your 
argument [.]" Tr. at p. 127. 
In his Motion for Directed Verdict, Butt argued the statute anticipated hard core 
pornography and the State had an additional burden of establishing what the community 
standards were. Tr. at p. 99. Butt requested the trial court to find that the material in the 
instant case was not the kind anticipated by the harmful material statute or, in its absence 
find the harmful material statute unconstitutionally vague. Tr. at pp. 99-100. The State 
argued the material, taken as a whole and whether it is patently offense to prevailing 
standards in the adult community as a whole, was a question for the jury. Tr. at p. 100. 
The State argued it had made a prima facie case. Tr. at p. 101. 
The Instructions defined "prurient" as "marked by or arousing an immoderate or 
unwholesome interest or desire." Tr. at p. 124. Butt also proposed the following for 
instructions to the jury: 
In determining whether something appeals to prurient interests using 
community standards, you should consider if the material: 
(a) Stimulates sexual response. 
(b) The predominate theme is sex for sex's sake. 
(c) Whether expert witnesses have established the prurient intent. 
(d) Whether surveys have established community standards. 
(e) Whether it is patently offensive' in its depiction of sexual conduct. 
(f) It lacks serious artistic, political, scientific or literary value. 
R0045. 
Accordingly the jury in this matter was required to rely on the local current 
standards in the vicinage where Butf s crimes occurred. UT, CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(2). 
The jurors were entitled to draw on their own knowledge of the views of the average 
person in their community to make the required determination of whether Butt distributed 
harmful material to a minor. International Amusements at 1114. For material to be 
obscene, it must depict or describe patently offensive hard core sexual conduct. Miller at 
27. Whether the Letters were patently offensive was a question of fact for the jury in this 
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matter to decide. Id. at 30. While such determination has appeared to have occurred in 
this matter in light of the jury's verdict, the jury was required to draw on the standards of 
their community. Id. 
Taylor further upheld the standard the jury in this matter should have relied on was 
the impact of the Letters on an average person. Ibid, at 448. Hence, the jury could not 
rely on their personal opinion or its effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person 
or group. Id. Accordingly, the jury was instructed "to utilize the perspective of the 
average person, and in the process put aside your own particular tolerance or lack thereof 
of the material in question. You must apply the community standard without your own 
sensitivities so coloring your perspective as to render the notion of a community standard 
meaningless." Tr. at p. 124. 
However, the jurors were required to apply the community standard without 
applying his or her sensitivities affecting the outcome. Taylor at 449. The State had the 
burden of showing the Letters violated the community standard. Id. at 450. The State in 
this matter declined to evidence any kind of community standard, leaving the 
determination of the standard to the jury. Id. at Pipenburg at 708. The jury 
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was required to measure the Letters' patent offensiveness against contemporary 
community standards and, such juror discretion does not go unchecked. Taylor at 
448. The community standard given to the jury should have included the kinds of 
conduct that amount to patently offensive, which are the hard core types of 
conduct given in Miller. Not simply stick drawings that are not hard core conduct 
or patently offensive. Therefore, as such was absent, the jury did not rely upon the 
proper community standard and error occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfull> requests 
that this Court reverse the Judgment and in this matter and take any such further 
action as this Court deems necessary. 
DATED this /V^day of M A A - J ^ / , 2009. 
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Attorney for Eric Leon Butt 
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Case No: 081700097 FS 
Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Date: July 15, 2009 
PRESENT 
Clerk: mickiev 
Prosecutor: CRAIG C HALLS 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILLIAM L SCHULTZ 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 30, 1973 
Audio 
Tape Count: 9:11:18 
CHARGES 
1. DEALING IN MATERIALS HARMFUL TO MINOR - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/15/2009 Guilty 
2. DEALING IN MATERIALS HARMFUL TO MINOR - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/15/2009 Guilty 
ARRAIGNMENT 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
TRIAL 
COUNT: 9:11:18 
Prospective jurors are welcomed and the first 16 are called, 
sworn, and questioned. Voir dire process is completed and the 
final jurors are sworn to the second oath. Jurors are admonished 
and excused and court continues outside the 
presence of the jurors. Counsel and defendant are present. Mr. 
Halls states concerns regarding jurors knowing that the defendant 
was incarcerated at the time of this offense. Mr. Schultz states 
that he and his client are aware of this concern 
and have no problem having it known to the jurors. Court is in 
recess 10:08:21 Court resumes and all members of the jury, 
counsel and defendant are present. Jury instructions and 
information are read. 
COUNT: 10:30: 
Mr. Halls gives opening statement. Mr. Schultz moves to exclude 
witnessess and all potential witnesses are excused from the 
Case No: 081700097 
Date: Jul 15, 2009 
presence of the court. 10:43:49 Alan Freestone is called, sworn, 
and examined by Mr. Halls and cross-examined by Mr. Schultz. 
COUNT: 11:11 
Jurors are admonished and excused and court continues outside the 
presence of the jury. Mr. Schultz addresses court regarding 
statutory regulations determining the ages of the defendants 
children. 
COUNT: 11:37 
Deputy Martha A. Johnson is called, sworn, and examined by Mr. 
Schultz outside the presence of the jurors. Counsel moves court to 
suppress testimony of Ms. Johnson and to strike Mr. Freestone's 
testimony. Court denies request. 
COUNT: 11:46 
Jurors are brought back into the courtroom and all jurors are 
present. Mr. Halls cross-examines Ms. Johnson and Mr. Schultz 
re-directs. 11:51 Members of the jury are admonished and excused 
and court continues outside the presence of the jury. 
Mr. Schultz makes a motion of prima facie and states reasons. 
Court denies motion for directed verdict. 1:01:30 Court resumes. 
Mr. Schultz waives opening statement. Eric Leon Butt Jr. is 
called, sworn, and examined by Mr. Schultz and cross-
examined by Mr. Halls. 1:20:18 Juors are excused and court 
continues outside the presence of the jury. Jury instructions are 
debated. 1:34:19 Court is in recess. 
COUNT: 1:59: 
Court is back in recession and all members of the jury, counsel 
and defendant are present. Additional jury instructions are read. 
2:05:25 Mr. Halls and Mr. Schultz both give closing arguements. 
2:30:50 Mr. Halls delivers final closing arguement. 
COUNT: 2:36 
Bailiff oath is given and jurors are excused for deliberation. 
3:53:48 Court is back in session. Counsel and defendant are 
present. Jurors are escorted back into the courtroom and all 
accounted for. The verdict is read, jurors are polled and excused. 
COUNT: 4:00 
Mr. Halls makes recommendations and Mr. Schultz states that his 
client would like to waive time for sentencing. Court sentences 
the defendant to 0-5 years in prison for each offense, to be served 
concurrently. These 2 counts are to be served 
consecutively with the current prison sentencing. Defendant is 
remanded over to the Department of Corrections for transportation 
to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
4:12:03 Court is in recess. 
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SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DEALING IN MATERIALS HARMFUL 
TO MINOR a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DEALING IN MATERIALS HARMFUL 
TO MINOR a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SAN JUAN County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Counts 1 and 2 are to be served concurrently and are to be served 
consecutively with current prison sentence. 
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